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The article discusses the problematic aspects of artificial intelligence technology application. The author's 
classification of artificial intelligence types is proposed, depending on their material expression (artificial 
intelligence unit, artificial intelligence carrier and artificial intelligence). The study allowed us to form the 
theoretical and legal foundations of artificial intelligence punishment system development. The authors proposed 
the types of artificial intelligence punishments and described their essence. To such types of punishments, they 
include complete deactivation (destruction) of artificial intelligence; partial deactivation of artificial intelligence; 
confiscation of artificial intelligence in favour of the state; the prohibition of artificial intelligence use in certain 
fields of activity; the implementation of gratuitous activities by artificial intelligence in the interests of the state 
or society; provision of a convict status (unreliable) for artificial intelligence. They noted that in the current 
conditions of the digital economy development and the pace of digital technology introduction, the international 
community needs to develop an effective punishment system of artificial intelligence that has committed illegal 
acts. 
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intelligence punishment types, criminal liability, criminal law. 
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El artículo analiza los aspectos problemáticos de la aplicación de la tecnología de inteligencia artificial. Se 
propone la clasificación del autor de los tipos de inteligencia artificial, en función de su expresión material 
(unidad de inteligencia artificial, portador de inteligencia artificial e inteligencia artificial). El estudio nos 
permitió formar los fundamentos teóricos y legales del desarrollo del sistema de castigo por inteligencia 
artificial. Los autores propusieron los tipos de castigos de inteligencia artificial y describieron su esencia. Para 
este tipo de castigos, incluyen la desactivación (destrucción) completa de la inteligencia artificial; desactivación 
parcial de la inteligencia artificial; confiscación de inteligencia artificial a favor del estado; la prohibición del 
uso de inteligencia artificial en determinados campos de actividad; la implementación de actividades gratuitas 
por inteligencia artificial en interés del Estado o la sociedad; provisión de un estado de convicto (no confiable) 
para inteligencia artificial. Señalaron que en las condiciones actuales del desarrollo de la economía digital y el 
ritmo de introducción de la tecnología digital, la comunidad internacional necesita desarrollar un sistema de 
castigo efectivo de inteligencia artificial que haya cometido actos ilegales. 
 
Palabras clave: inteligencia artificial, clasificación de tipos de inteligencia artificial, sistema de castigo, tipos de 






Uncontrolled technology for Artificial Intelligence 
could do more harm than good without human 
rights and ethics. During RightsCon 2018, 
UNESCO held an interactive session focusing on 
existing debates on developing and applying big 
data and AI technologies. The participants 
emphasized the urgent need for these emerging 
technologies to develop human rights and ethical 
standards. Uncontrolled application of artificial 
intelligence technology (hereinafter - AI) creates 
certain threats to the safe development of society 
and the state, determined by the lack of adapted 
technologies, in accordance with the AI specifics, 
criminal law mechanisms for public relation 
protection, the presence of legal uncertainty 
concerning the issue of criminal liability subject in 
case of direct damage by AI technology (Z. I. 
Khisamova & Begishev, 2019a). Artificial 
intelligence and other new digital technologies, 
such as the Internet of Things or distributed ledger 
technologies, have the ability to bring about a better 
transformation of our communities and economies. 
However, in order to reduce the risk of damage, 
these technologies can cause, such as bodily injury 
or other damage, their deployment must come with 
appropriate safeguards. A significant number of 
works have been devoted to the study of these 
issues, as well as the aspects of the public relation 
legal regulation arising from AI use (Alzou’bi et 
al., 2014; I. R. Begishev, 2020; I. R. Begishev et 
al., n.d.; Ildar R. Begishev et al., 2019, 2020; Ildar 
R. Begishev & Khisamova, 2018; Bikeev et al., 
2019; Bokovnya et al., 2019; Cameron, 1990; Z. 
Khisamova et al., 2019; Z. I. Khisamova & 
Begishev, 2019b; Zarina I. Khisamova et al., 2019; 
Latypova et al., 2019; Rademacher, 2020; Shestak 
et al., 2019; Shestak & Volevodz, 2019; Simmler & 
Markwalder, 2019; Sukhodolov et al., 2020; 
Sukhodolov & Bychkova, 2018). 
 
Objective 
Based on their content expression (unit of artificial 
intelligence, artificial intelligence carrier and 
artificial intelligence), the author's classification of 
artificial intelligence types is proposed. The writers 
suggested the types of punishments for artificial 
intelligence and defined their meaning. 
 
Material and Methods 
 
The materials for work were the articles posted in 
scientific journals and on websites. 
The methodological basis of the study is the 
combination of scientific knowledge methods, 
including abstract logical, comparison and 
correlation analysis. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
In order to build a system of artificial intelligence 
(hereinafter - AI) punishment, it is necessary to 
touch upon such an important aspect as its material 
expression. Not only the way and mechanism of 
punishment application to it but also their types, as 
well as their measure, directly depends on the way 
the AI is represented in external reality. It should 
be noted that a similar problem does not arise in 
relation to a person, since their harming always 
occurs by affecting the phenomena and the objects 
of the world. 
 
In the affected context, the human body is its 
material expression, which is quite obvious and 
does not cause discussions. Regarding AI, there is 
no such certainty and consistency. It can also 
manifest itself in autonomous, self-driving cars (as 
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in the situation with a car accident under the control 
of the Uber AI company, which caused death); as 
an integral part of a certain subject that is not 
capable of functioning outside its intended purpose 
prescribed by AI (for example, an unmanned aerial 
vehicle); or it may exist only in cybernetic reality 
without material expression. The definition of AI 
punishments is made dependent on its material 
expression. 
 
We offer the following classification of AI types, 
depending on their material expression: 
AI unit - an object of the material world, which is 
an integral part of AI, created to ensure the AI 
potential implementation and capable of 
influencing the surrounding reality through 
mechanical movements. This item does not 
represent value when AI is removed from it since it 
is directly intended for the implementation of its 
functions. 
 
An AI carrier is an object of the material world that 
contains AI technology but is incapable of fulfilling 
its functions and mechanical actions. Its main 
purpose is to keep AI technology on itself. 
An AI program is a cybernetic creation that does 
not have a material expression and exists 
exclusively in the digital space. According to its 
qualities, it is capable of carrying out actions 
involving criminal law consequences. Moreover, 
the AI program can be used in modern digital 
networks. 
Based on the foregoing, we can conclude that it is 
necessary to develop a theoretical and legal 
approach to AI punishment system development, 
depending on its material expression. 
 
As for the system of AI punishment, the authors 
proceed from the fact that it represents the 
application of coercive measures against the subject 
in its epistemological essence with the aim of 
inducing him to lawful behaviour, forming his 
conviction of the impossibility or inappropriateness 
of criminal law prohibition violations, eliminating 
the antisocial attitude, and creating respect for the 
law. Besides, the punishment implements general 
and private criminal law prevention and protects 
society from the entities that pose a threat of harm 
to public relations protected by criminal law. 
 
The punishment contains two elements: legal - the 
deprivation or restriction of the right and freedom, 
which consists in the person’s ability elimination to 
realize a certain type and measure of possible 
behaviour (scope of actions), which follows from 
the alienated right or freedom, which is used to 
restore social justice, correct a convicted person, 
and to prevent the commission of new crimes; and 
actual - the creation of conditions, factual 
circumstances in which the exercise of this right is 
impossible. 
 
The following is fundamental - based on the court 
position, punishment is deprivation or restriction of 
a right or freedom, from which a certain type and 
measure of a person possible behaviour follows 
guaranteed by law, but alienated from him as a 
measure of state coercion, which is expressed in 
creating conditions that exclude the possibility of 
exercising the right, that is, the ability to act in a 
certain way. 
 
The abovementioned clearly implies the possibility 
of AI punishment application, since the only 
difficulty may be the creation of conditions (that is, 
the actual element), and not the fundamental 
impossibility of criminal punishment application to 
AI as a legal model, which, on the contrary, seems 
reasonable and is quite possible from a legal point 
of view. 
 
Accordingly, the use of AI punishments in any of 
its material manifestations seems motivated and 
expedient, and they are exclusively practical, and 
their overcoming is dependent on the efforts made 
and does not have fundamentally unremovable 
obstacles. 
 
However, we believe that the full comparison of 
punishment mechanism for a man and AI would be 
wrong. If in the first case, the main goal is to 
correct the convict, then in the second case the 
main goal is to ensure the safety of society, the 
individual and the state from the illegal activities of 
AI, and prevent the commission of crimes. We do 
not exclude that some of the proposed types of 
punishments can create a conviction in AI about the 
inadmissibility of illegal behaviour. Along with 
this, there is no sufficient reason to count on this 
result unambiguously. Moreover, in relation to AI, 
the activity on the formulation of punishment types 
is not limited to those humanistic principles and 
norms that are unconditional and internationally 
recognized for humans, which is a certain part 
predetermines the potential prevalence in those 
types of punishments application that consist in AI 
destruction, or in a significant restriction of its 
functionality. 
 
In Russian criminal law, the purpose of criminal 
punishment is to restore social justice and correct 
the convicted person, as well as to prevent the 
commission of new crimes. There are reasonable 
doubts about the effectiveness of traditional types 
of criminal punishment application to AI, such as a 
fine or imprisonment for the purpose of an “AI 
criminal” change (Z. I. Khisamova & Begishev, 
2019a). 
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The legal literature presents several positions 
regarding the definition of punishment list. 





- granting the status of a criminal (which, from his 
point of view, will have a preventive effect in 
relation to other participants of the legal 
relationship). 
 
Evaluating this list comprehensively, we conclude 
that it is not without drawbacks, which boil down 
to the following: when formulating the types of 
punishments, the author does not explain their 
nature, order and conditions of use, which forms 
some incompleteness of presentation and ambiguity 
in understanding the terms used. In particular, the 
question arises about the content of deactivation as 
a process: does it involve the physical destruction 
of the material component of AI? Besides, it seems 
that the list provided by the author is not capable of 
ensuring the individualization of punishment and 
its compliance with the nature and degree of public 
danger of the crime committed, since the first two 
types of punishment presuppose the termination of 
the AI in the form in which it existed before the 
forced impact. Then the third type in its punitive 
potential is rather similar to another measure of a 
criminally legal nature. 
 
Software, for example, unmanned vehicles or 
devices for automatic exchange trading, does not 
have self-awareness or a proper degree of self-
awareness, which excludes subjective 
wrongfulness, as well as the achievement of 
punishment goals. In such cases, it is more efficient 
to reprogram or replace the device without using a 
criminal law mechanism. Actually, criminal 
punishment application for such devices can only 
achieve the goal of crime commission prevention, 
and to restore social justice to a lesser extent and 
the correction of the convicted person it is 
extremely unlikely (Mosechkin, 2019). 
F.V. Uzhov takes a somewhat categorical position 
in relation to the prospects of AI punishment 
(Uzhov, 2017), which indicates that the “re-
education” of AI can only be implemented by its 
complete reprogramming, which, according to the 
scientist, can be “compared with lobotomy in 
relation to a person,” that is, the author gives an 
additional explanation - absolute and irreversible 
change the properties of AI. The second way, in his 
opinion, is the disposal of the machine (in this case, 
the content of the coercive effect does not change 
per se. Complete destruction is supposed in both 
proposed variants). The author’s attempt to 
formulate the actual conditions for the fairness of 
the punishment application to AI, to which he 
refers is of interest: the value of the machine, the 
number of “mistakes” made by it, the ability to 
eliminate these shortcomings by technical means 
(Uzhov, 2017). Nevertheless, the possibility of the 
given criteria application is doubtful, since the 
author has not explained by what types of 
punishment an alternative is formed in principle: 
they are only offered destruction per se. 
 
G. Hallevy rightly asks the question of criminal 
liability applicability to the AI that committed the 
crime and, thus, of criminal punishment goal 
achievement (Hallevy, 2010). G. Hallevy’s 
reasoning seems more constructive, which is 
logically justified, although it is of a theoretical 
nature. Scientists are particularly focused on the 
fact that the existing concepts of criminal 
punishment require doctrinal review, and the 
existing obstacles of punishment application to AI 





Conventional wisdom holds that punishing AI is 
incompatible with universal concepts of criminal 
law, such as the right to be guilty and the need for a 
guilty mind. We prove that AI punishment cannot 
be categorically ruled out with fast theoretical 
arguments based on analogies to corporate and 
strict criminal responsibility, as well as familiar 
concepts of imputation. AI punishment can result in 
general deterrence and expressive advantages, and 
negative constraints such as punishment in excess 
of guilt do not need to run afoul. The following 
types of AI punishments are offered; their essence 
is described: 
 
1. complete deactivation (destruction) of AI; 
2. partial deactivation of AI; 
3. confiscation of AI in favour of the state; 
4. The ban on AI application in certain areas of 
activity; 
5. the implementation of AI gratuitous activities in 
the interests of the state or society; 
6. giving AI the status of a convicted (unreliable). 
Thus, in the current conditions of the digital 
economy development, in order to ensure the 
effectiveness of public relation protection from 
unlawful attacks by AI, the world community needs 
to develop theoretical and legal foundations for AI 
punishment system development. 
Based on the foregoing, the punishment system of 
the AI seems possible to determine in the following 
edition: 
 
Complete deactivation (destruction) of AI is a 
forced impact on the neural connections of AI. 
Thus, they completely lose their properties. The 
specified type of punishment is the most repressive. 
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It is believed that it is necessary to use complete 
deactivation (destruction) as the only form of 
punishment in the case of an AI committing a grave 
and especially grave crime.  
 
The next type of punishment in terms of repressive 
potential is the partial deactivation of AI - transfer 
to the category of weaker AI, by its potential 
intellectual reduction. The specified type of 
punishment, in our opinion, is advisable to 
implement by forced impact onto AI neural 
connections. Thus, the ability to process a certain 
amount of information from the outside world can 
be eliminated. At the same time, part of the 
information necessary for the implementation of 
socially significant functions will be available, but 
clearly insufficient for conscious-willful 
autonomous behaviour. 
 
We believe that when they resolve the issue of this 
type of punishment application, courts should also 
establish the economic feasibility of continuing the 
functioning of AI. It seems possible to match the 
specified type of punishment with a specific 
probationary period during which the activities of 
AI will be constantly monitored by the supervisory 
authority. 
 
Confiscation of AI in favour of the state is a forced 
withdrawal of AI from the owner who disposes of it 
and turning it in favour of the state in order to 
perform useful public-state functions. 
 
The specified type of punishment is even more 
dependent on the economic feasibility of AI 
functioning maintenance than the previous one. 
However, in view of the AI possible willingness to 
commit crimes, or the incomplete elimination of 
the antisocial attitude, it is advisable to use it in the 
event of a crime commission of small or medium 
gravity for the first time, or due to an accidental 
combination of circumstances. 
 
We also consider it is necessary to take into 
account that at the present stage of development, 
each AI represents significant scientific, industrial, 
defence, and equally different social or state value. 
These circumstances caused us to deduce this type 
of punishment for AI, as to confiscation in favour 
of the state. We are convinced that it would be 
unreasonable to destroy AI completely, or reduce 
its properties significantly when AI committed a 
crime that does not have a sufficient degree of 
public danger; it is quite possible to achieve the 
goals of punishment in the ways that do not involve 
causing harm to AI.  
Next, let's consider the prohibition of AI use in 
certain areas of activity, which, in our opinion, may 
look like the deprivation of the right to occupy 
certain positions or engage in certain activities as a 
punishment applied to a person. The specified 
punishment is advisable to apply only in cases 
where the AI committed an offence in certain types 
of activities (for example, it carried out the 
incorrect diagnosis of patients, violated the road 
rules, etc.). At the same time, the need arises to fix 
these offences and to develop a database to make a 
decision on the prohibition of functioning in certain 
areas. 
 
The implementation of AI gratuitous activities in 
the interests of the state or society is the forced 
implementation of community service by AI. The 
specified type of punishment is directed to a greater 
extent as the means of social justice material 
restoration and can be used as an additional type of 
punishment. In other words, the main value of this 
type of punishment is that in the case of an AI 
crime of small or medium gravity causing damage 
to property, the AI is given the opportunity to 
compensate for the loss by its own labour. At the 
same time, a balance is maintained between the 
elimination of the sentence execution cost and the 
compensation of the damage caused by the AI 
activities. To clarify the essence of this type of 
punishment, it is quite possible to compare it with 
compulsory work. The difference, however, lies in 
the fact that a person carries out his own re-
education when performing the latter, and this is 
the punishment goal. In the case of AI, the focus is 
on compensation for caused material damage. 
 
Giving AI the status of a convicted (unreliable). 
The specified negative legal consequence cannot be 
related to the types of punishment with sufficient 
justification. It can be attributed to other measures 
of a criminal-legal nature, because of small 
repressive potential. This measure consists in 
obligatory informing the counterparty of the AI 
about the fact of an AI crime commission, which 
will inevitably entail reputation losses for the AI 
and, in our opinion, will have a tangible deterrent, 
especially in the field of commercial activity, 
thereby fully implementing general and private 
prevention. The indicated measure seems 
reasonable and expedient for use only in the case of 
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